Russell divides the twelve chapters into four parts. Although all the chapters are self-standing, the collection can be alternatively comprehended holistically as building to a distinctive compatibilist view of moral responsibility, with strong Strawsonian roots and a striking leaning toward the pessimistic attitude of our ability for self-determination as agents. What stands out especially about this collection is the way in which Russell marries matters of fate and luck with our conception of ourselves as agents more broadly beyond the moral realm. Moral skeptics will find rich material proposed as a counter to their strong pessimism about moral practices.
INTERNALIST OPTIMISM PHILOSOPHY FREE
The collection is likely to be of interest to those familiar with both the contemporary and history of philosophy literature on free will and moral agency, especially Humeans and Strawsonians.
What is illuminating and skillful about the collection is, first, how Russell ties these optimist and pessimist positions to the historical literature in philosophy and, second, weaves a hybrid optimist-pessimist compatibilism via his critical discussion of contemporary accounts. The pessimist here is anyone who worries that determinism limits our moral agency in significant respects - typically, albeit not exclusively, the incompatibilist.
Both strands can be characterized in terms of the ongoing struggle between the 'optimist' and the 'pessimist' regarding moral responsibility, with strong ties throughout to Strawson's legacy of "Freedom and Resentment." The optimist here is broadly the compatibilist who does not take determinism to threaten free and moral agency. Paul Russell's book is a greatest-hits collection with two main strands: a critical account of how the moral responsibility debate has proceeded from Hobbes to post-Strawson and a positive account of what the compatibilist strategy ought to be.
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